Tweet
Stretched Thin
By Frederick W. Kagan
Sunday, April 18, 2004; Page B07
The minute reexamination of the Bush administration's response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has obscured much more important failings that continue to endanger our national security. There is no doubt that the administration could have performed better than it did both before and after Sept. 11. On the other hand, the recriminations are unfair. Knowing which of the many possible threats that intelligence agencies constantly identify are real and require dramatic action is the very hardest part of decision-making. Requiring perfection in this area is simply unrealistic.
We can, however, hold the administration responsible for failing to heed warnings that the United States' armed forces were too small, that the important wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could not be waged primarily with air power and that only large deployments of ground forces throughout both countries could secure America's aims and strengthen America's security. It is ironic that critics of the administration are so focused on rehashing past failures while ignoring policies that are preparing us for future disasters.
For nearly a decade, observers have argued that America's armed forces were too small to accomplish the many missions they faced and might face. The reduction in the size of the armed forces following the end of the Cold War was too drastic. It reflected a desire to reap repeated "peace dividends" more than any realistic evaluation of the strategic situation. In the 10 years after 1990, the Army was cut from 18 active divisions to 10, with comparable reductions in the other services. As a result, many Army leaders found it painful to contemplate keeping even two combat brigades (out of 33) in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.
It might seem that Sept. 11 would have changed all of that. As the Bush administration immediately ordered the beginning of hostilities against Afghanistan, followed shortly by war against Iraq, surely it realized that the armed forces appropriate for a "strategic pause" were inadequate for a period of large-scale war and massive peacekeeping. Not so. The Army today (like all the other armed services) is smaller than it was in 1997. But the problem has changed from maintaining 15,000 to 20,000 troops in the Balkans to keeping more than 135,000 in Iraq, in addition to continued deployments in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
America has already paid a high price for this parsimony. Failure to deploy ground forces to Afghanistan permitted a large number of al Qaeda fighters who had concentrated north of Kabul to escape to the inaccessible mountains on the Pakistani border. Failure to take control of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and other critical cities has seriously hindered the United States from establishing a stable and legitimate government in Afghanistan.
In Iraq, the price has been even higher. Failure to get ground forces rapidly into the Sunni Triangle allowed more than 15,000 Republican Guard soldiers and other of Saddam Hussein's troops to melt away into the countryside -- with their weapons and expertise -- and form the nucleus of the resistance to the United States and the new Iraqi government. Failure to take immediate and full control of Baghdad permitted looting and disorder that began the process of discrediting the U.S. presence in the country. Failure to maintain adequate force levels since then has led to a failure to quell the growing insurgency and critical delays in reestablishing stability and civil society in Iraq.
All these failures flowed from a greater failure of understanding. This administration came to office with a belief that war is all about destroying targets, that ground forces are unnecessary and that technology is supreme. Much to our sorrow, we have experienced the fact that none of those beliefs are true. Wars of regime change cannot be fought mainly with missiles. Ground forces that can interact with people, perform police functions and maintain order must be present in large numbers during and after hostilities. Excessive haste in withdrawing the inadequate numbers of troops the United States sent to Iraq has only exacerbated these problems.
We must increase the U.S. presence in Iraq substantially, although we will pay a high price for that policy at such a late date. But where will the troops come from? They can come, at this point, only from keeping troops in Iraq who have already served their year there or from sending back troops who have just returned from their missions in Iraq. This policy will destroy morale and harm recruitment and retention, and it will seriously undermine training. Yet it is the only policy we can follow now.
And what if another crisis arises elsewhere? Kosovo is simmering very near a boil, Iran is playing brinkmanship games with U.N. weapons inspectors and who knows where Crisis X -- the one we will probably find ourselves engaged in -- is developing? All we can know for sure is that the tank is dry.
These are the issues that deserve blue-ribbon panels and the urgent attention of Congress. The people to blame for Sept. 11 are Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. The people to blame for our failures since then are Donald Rumsfeld and the Bush administration -- as well as the many critics who have urged even greater defense reductions and those who seek to score cheap political points rather than addressing the real issues.
The writer is a military historian and co-author of "While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today."
By Frederick W. Kagan
Sunday, April 18, 2004; Page B07
The minute reexamination of the Bush administration's response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has obscured much more important failings that continue to endanger our national security. There is no doubt that the administration could have performed better than it did both before and after Sept. 11. On the other hand, the recriminations are unfair. Knowing which of the many possible threats that intelligence agencies constantly identify are real and require dramatic action is the very hardest part of decision-making. Requiring perfection in this area is simply unrealistic.
We can, however, hold the administration responsible for failing to heed warnings that the United States' armed forces were too small, that the important wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could not be waged primarily with air power and that only large deployments of ground forces throughout both countries could secure America's aims and strengthen America's security. It is ironic that critics of the administration are so focused on rehashing past failures while ignoring policies that are preparing us for future disasters.
For nearly a decade, observers have argued that America's armed forces were too small to accomplish the many missions they faced and might face. The reduction in the size of the armed forces following the end of the Cold War was too drastic. It reflected a desire to reap repeated "peace dividends" more than any realistic evaluation of the strategic situation. In the 10 years after 1990, the Army was cut from 18 active divisions to 10, with comparable reductions in the other services. As a result, many Army leaders found it painful to contemplate keeping even two combat brigades (out of 33) in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.
It might seem that Sept. 11 would have changed all of that. As the Bush administration immediately ordered the beginning of hostilities against Afghanistan, followed shortly by war against Iraq, surely it realized that the armed forces appropriate for a "strategic pause" were inadequate for a period of large-scale war and massive peacekeeping. Not so. The Army today (like all the other armed services) is smaller than it was in 1997. But the problem has changed from maintaining 15,000 to 20,000 troops in the Balkans to keeping more than 135,000 in Iraq, in addition to continued deployments in the Balkans and Afghanistan.
America has already paid a high price for this parsimony. Failure to deploy ground forces to Afghanistan permitted a large number of al Qaeda fighters who had concentrated north of Kabul to escape to the inaccessible mountains on the Pakistani border. Failure to take control of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and other critical cities has seriously hindered the United States from establishing a stable and legitimate government in Afghanistan.
In Iraq, the price has been even higher. Failure to get ground forces rapidly into the Sunni Triangle allowed more than 15,000 Republican Guard soldiers and other of Saddam Hussein's troops to melt away into the countryside -- with their weapons and expertise -- and form the nucleus of the resistance to the United States and the new Iraqi government. Failure to take immediate and full control of Baghdad permitted looting and disorder that began the process of discrediting the U.S. presence in the country. Failure to maintain adequate force levels since then has led to a failure to quell the growing insurgency and critical delays in reestablishing stability and civil society in Iraq.
All these failures flowed from a greater failure of understanding. This administration came to office with a belief that war is all about destroying targets, that ground forces are unnecessary and that technology is supreme. Much to our sorrow, we have experienced the fact that none of those beliefs are true. Wars of regime change cannot be fought mainly with missiles. Ground forces that can interact with people, perform police functions and maintain order must be present in large numbers during and after hostilities. Excessive haste in withdrawing the inadequate numbers of troops the United States sent to Iraq has only exacerbated these problems.
We must increase the U.S. presence in Iraq substantially, although we will pay a high price for that policy at such a late date. But where will the troops come from? They can come, at this point, only from keeping troops in Iraq who have already served their year there or from sending back troops who have just returned from their missions in Iraq. This policy will destroy morale and harm recruitment and retention, and it will seriously undermine training. Yet it is the only policy we can follow now.
And what if another crisis arises elsewhere? Kosovo is simmering very near a boil, Iran is playing brinkmanship games with U.N. weapons inspectors and who knows where Crisis X -- the one we will probably find ourselves engaged in -- is developing? All we can know for sure is that the tank is dry.
These are the issues that deserve blue-ribbon panels and the urgent attention of Congress. The people to blame for Sept. 11 are Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. The people to blame for our failures since then are Donald Rumsfeld and the Bush administration -- as well as the many critics who have urged even greater defense reductions and those who seek to score cheap political points rather than addressing the real issues.
The writer is a military historian and co-author of "While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today."
Comment