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  • Invasion of the Isolationists

    Which will draw more comment - the content of the article or the author's name?

    Invasion of the Isolationists
    By FRANCIS FUKUYAMA
    Washington

    AS we mark four years since Sept. 11, 2001, one way to organize a review of what has happened in American foreign policy since that terrible day is with a question: To what extent has that policy flowed from the wellspring of American politics and culture, and to what extent has it flowed from the particularities of this president and this administration?

    It is tempting to see continuity with the American character and foreign policy tradition in the Bush administration's response to 9/11, and many have done so. We have tended toward the forcefully unilateral when we have felt ourselves under duress; and we have spoken in highly idealistic cadences in such times, as well. Nevertheless, neither American political culture nor any underlying domestic pressures or constraints have determined the key decisions in American foreign policy since Sept. 11.

    In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Americans would have allowed President Bush to lead them in any of several directions, and the nation was prepared to accept substantial risks and sacrifices. The Bush administration asked for no sacrifices from the average American, but after the quick fall of the Taliban it rolled the dice in a big way by moving to solve a longstanding problem only tangentially related to the threat from Al Qaeda - Iraq. In the process, it squandered the overwhelming public mandate it had received after Sept. 11. At the same time, it alienated most of its close allies, many of whom have since engaged in "soft balancing" against American influence, and stirred up anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

    The Bush administration could instead have chosen to create a true alliance of democracies to fight the illiberal currents coming out of the Middle East. It could also have tightened economic sanctions and secured the return of arms inspectors to Iraq without going to war. It could have made a go at a new international regime to battle proliferation. All of these paths would have been in keeping with American foreign policy traditions. But Mr. Bush and his administration freely chose to do otherwise.

    The administration's policy choices have not been restrained by domestic political concerns any more than by American foreign policy culture. Much has been made of the emergence of "red state" America, which supposedly constitutes the political base for President Bush's unilateralist foreign policy, and of the increased number of conservative Christians who supposedly shape the president's international agenda. But the extent and significance of these phenomena have been much exaggerated.

    So much attention has been paid to these false determinants of administration policy that a different political dynamic has been underappreciated. Within the Republican Party, the Bush administration got support for the Iraq war from the neoconservatives (who lack a political base of their own but who provide considerable intellectual firepower) and from what Walter Russell Mead calls "Jacksonian America" - American nationalists whose instincts lead them toward a pugnacious isolationism.

    Happenstance then magnified this unlikely alliance. Failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the inability to prove relevant connections between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda left the president, by the time of his second inaugural address, justifying the war exclusively in neoconservative terms: that is, as part of an idealistic policy of political transformation of the broader Middle East. The president's Jacksonian base, which provides the bulk of the troops serving and dying in Iraq, has no natural affinity for such a policy but would not abandon the commander in chief in the middle of a war, particularly if there is clear hope of success.

    This war coalition is fragile, however, and vulnerable to mishap. If Jacksonians begin to perceive the war as unwinnable or a failure, there will be little future support for an expansive foreign policy that focuses on promoting democracy. That in turn could drive the 2008 Republican presidential primaries in ways likely to affect the future of American foreign policy as a whole.

    Are we failing in Iraq? That's still unclear. The United States can control the situation militarily as long as it chooses to remain there in force, but our willingness to maintain the personnel levels necessary to stay the course is limited. The all-volunteer Army was never intended to fight a prolonged insurgency, and both the Army and Marine Corps face manpower and morale problems. While public support for staying in Iraq remains stable, powerful operational reasons are likely to drive the administration to lower force levels within the next year.

    With the failure to secure Sunni support for the constitution and splits within the Shiite community, it seems increasingly unlikely that a strong and cohesive Iraqi government will be in place anytime soon. Indeed, the problem now will be to prevent Iraq's constituent groups from looking to their own militias rather than to the government for protection. If the United States withdraws prematurely, Iraq will slide into greater chaos. That would set off a chain of unfortunate events that will further damage American credibility around the world and ensure that the United States remains preoccupied with the Middle East to the detriment of other important regions - Asia, for example - for years to come.

    We do not know what outcome we will face in Iraq. We do know that four years after 9/11, our whole foreign policy seems destined to rise or fall on the outcome of a war only marginally related to the source of what befell us on that day. There was nothing inevitable about this. There is everything to be regretted about it.

    Francis Fukuyama, a professor of international political economy at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is editorial board chairman of a new magazine, The American Interest.
    June 9, 1973 - The day athletic perfection was defined.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-Kva...eature=related

  • #2
    There is everything to be regretted about it.
    I remember saying when Iraq first came up (as I'm sure many did), "There'd better be weapons there, or there's going to be bloody hell to pay."

    Well....

    Comment


    • #3
      I haven't ever heard anyone reference the Jacksonian Americans before. Had you?
      June 9, 1973 - The day athletic perfection was defined.

      http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-Kva...eature=related

      Comment


      • #4
        Well, certainly not when talking about any time period not covered by 1820-40.

        Think it might be an apt description, though. Probably covers me.

        Comment


        • #5
          Did you agree with this?

          Failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the inability to prove relevant connections between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda left the president, by the time of his second inaugural address, justifying the war exclusively in neoconservative terms: that is, as part of an idealistic policy of political transformation of the broader Middle East. The president's Jacksonian base, which provides the bulk of the troops serving and dying in Iraq, has no natural affinity for such a policy but would not abandon the commander in chief in the middle of a war, particularly if there is clear hope of success.

          I ask not to pick a fight. If true, it seems to me to frame the relevant discussion to be what evidence is required (and do we have) to support "clear hope of success?"
          June 9, 1973 - The day athletic perfection was defined.

          http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-Kva...eature=related

          Comment


          • #6
            One of the better articles I've read. Thank you tbf.
            Un-Official Sponsor of Randy Choate and Kevin Siegrist

            Comment


            • #7
              I think there's probably more support for "draining the swamp" there than he suggests (but what do I know? I don't work at a think tank), but I agree in general.

              Yes, the relevant discussion IS "When can we declare success and get the hell out?", but it's one Bush won't make. He won't make any discussion, and that's his biggest failing.

              I think this war, even amended to post-non-WMD aims, was a sale that could have been made. He just never really bothered to make it. It's still not too late, but there's no reason to think a better articulation is coming any time soon, if ever.

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by Reggie Cleveland@Aug 31 2005, 10:46 AM
                I think there's probably more support for "draining the swamp" there than he suggests (but what do I know? I don't work at a think tank), but I agree in general.

                Yes, the relevant discussion IS "When can we declare success and get the hell out?", but it's one Bush won't make. He won't make any discussion, and that's his biggest failing.

                I think this war, even amended to post-non-WMD aims, was a sale that could have been made. He just never really bothered to make it. It's still not too late, but there's no reason to think a better articulation is coming any time soon, if ever.
                I concur that Americans probably would have accepted other aims and that Bush hasn't made them. My personal opinion as to why he didn't is because it takes a pretty articulate guy to make those points, and Bush ain't that guy.

                You've stated that we could leave as soon as the Iraqi army/police officers are trained. Here is where I'm frustrated by the lack of reliable information by which to measure whether we are succeeding in that regard. Lots of editorial writers have made the point that we've trained far fewer than the administration claims were trained, and that the trainees are made up of a lot of insurgents. I don't know whether the facts they rely on are any more reliable than what comes out of Rummy's mouth. We should demand the facts, and honestly analyze them to see if they indicate that real progress has been made. If they don't show any real progress, surely we have to consider the possible conclusion that we can't train them and cut our losses?

                The problem with getting the facts is that the administration has lost its credibility so most are going to be suspicious of any version it offers. And, as the author below correctly points out, its mantra is starting to sound eerily like one we've heard before.

                A Tale of Two Wars
                In Baghdad, I Hear Echoes of Saigon in '67

                By Lewis M. Simons
                Sunday, August 28, 2005; B01

                Iwent to Vietnam a hawk. It was July 1967; I was an ex-Marine and a reporter for the Associated Press. It took only a few months before I realized I was being fed official lies on a daily basis. Now, having spent decades covering war and its aftermath around the world, I have just been through an eerily reminiscent experience in Iraq.

                In the Baghdad of 2005, as in the Saigon of four decades ago, my government tells me that by staying the course, we'll cut out a vicious tumor metastasizing through the body of Western democracy.

                Today's cancer is terrorism, not the red menace. But the singular constant remains this: Armies and governments at war all lie. They tell us that we're winning hearts and minds, that the troops will be home for Christmas, that the mission is accomplished. They did it then, and they're doing it now.

                My hawkishness is long gone. I went to Iraq this May on an assignment for National Geographic magazine, already convinced that this war was a mistake. I found myself cloistered in a nightmare world, behind layers of 12-foot concrete barriers beyond which no thinking American strays without armed guards. I returned home a month later, certain that this war, like Vietnam, will never be won.

                What would "winning" in Iraq mean, anyway? A democratic society that's free to elect an anti-American, pro-Iranian, fundamentalist Islamic government? A land of gushing oil wells feeding international oil company profits at U.S. taxpayers' expense? Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis joining hands to end terrorism around the world? Since, in my judgment, we were wrong to go in, I'm afraid there's no good way to get out.

                Americans didn't know what "winning" meant in Vietnam, either. Most didn't understand the enemy, its objectives or the lengths to which it was prepared to go to attain them. We had a fuzzy notion of communist "world domination," and the "domino theory" and no realization that what the Vietnamese wanted, south and north, was independence. They didn't want to take over Southeast Asia. They didn't want to invade Los Angeles. They wanted to run their own country. They wanted us out.

                Nor do we understand Iraq. The truth -- that Iraq was not a terrorist haven before we invaded, but we're making it into one today -- has been thickly painted over with unending coats of misinformation.

                The enemy body-count fiasco at Saigon's daily "5 o'clock follies" -- as military briefings were dubbed by a derisive press corps -- has been replaced by meaningless claims of dead insurgents. Lyndon Johnson's vision of "light at the end of the tunnel" has evolved into Dick Cheney's embarrassing "last throes." Where 392 Americans were killed in action in Vietnam from 1962 through 1964, the first three years of the war, (and 58,000 by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 1975), after 2 1/2 years in Iraq we have nearly 1,900 American KIAs. Where 2 million Vietnamese were killed by the war's end, we have no idea how many Iraqis have died since we unleashed "shock and awe." Is it 10,000, 20,000, 30,000? More? Who knows? Who in America cares?

                This blithe American disregard for their lives infuriates Iraqis. After President Bush recently congratulated soldiers at Fort Bragg for fighting the terrorists in Iraq so that we wouldn't have to face them here at home, a Baghdad University professor told an interviewer that Bush was saying that Iraqis had to die to make Americans safe.

                What we failed to understand in Vietnam -- that people who want foreign occupiers out of their country are willing and prepared to withstand any kind of privation and risk for however long it takes -- we are failing, once again, to grasp in Iraq.

                I've returned repeatedly to Vietnam since the war. About 20 miles northwest of Saigon, in Cu Chi, I had one of the more harrowing experiences of my reporting career, crawling for an hour through black, airless, grave-like tunnels that spider-web for well over 100 miles beneath the jungle floor. (This was before the Tourism Ministry enlarged some of the passages, to accommodate super-size Western travelers.)

                Here, entire armies and civilian communities had lived and worked and plotted attacks, through not just the American war but the earlier war against the French. With dirt dropping into my sweat-stinging eyes, my imagination raced: What must it have been like with tanks and bombers rumbling overhead? When I stumbled out, heart pounding, I told my guide that finally I understood why his side had won.

                Today, Muslim suicide bombers and terrorists are our Viet Cong. We can bring 'em on, smoke 'em out and hunt 'em down from now until doomsday, but the line of committed volunteers seems only to grow longer. The world -- not just the Middle East, but South and Southeast Asia, Europe and North America -- is being populated with more and more alienated and bitter young Muslims who feel that they have nothing to lose. The ongoing U.S. military presence in Iraq and across the Middle East doesn't intimidate them; it just stokes their fury.

                That there is no military solution to this conundrum is clearly illustrated by a ride I took on my first day in Baghdad. The small plane I flew on from Amman, Jordan, corkscrewed into Baghdad airport early one afternoon. The South African pilot warned the 20 passengers that the stomach-heaving descent might be uncomfortable, but that it was necessary in order to avoid any heat-seeking missiles. The last time I'd made such a landing was in April 1975, on a flight into Phnom Penh as a correspondent for The Washington Post. Two weeks later, Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge.

                I was bound this time for the relative security of the walled-in Green Zone, just five miles from the airport. For security reasons, we could not leave immediately. I was assigned one of two dozen canvas cots in a large tent. It was air-conditioned. (This -- along with Internet availability, 30-minute-guaranteed to-your-tent-door Pizza Hut delivery, Cuban cigars at the PX, fresh meals and regularly sanitized portable toilets -- is one of the gains the U.S. military has achieved since Vietnam.) We weren't told our departure time.

                At 3 a.m. a chipper sergeant with a bullhorn voice flicked on the tent lights and told us to get up and put on body armor and helmets. Three Rhino Runner buses, painted desert-tan and heavily steel-plated, were lined up and 90 of us, mostly GIs and civilian contractors, boarded. Three armed Humvees preceded us; three followed. Overhead clattered three Blackhawk helicopters.

                Again I was reminded of Vietnam, where the GIs used to say that the night belonged to the VC. In Iraq, it's the roads -- where IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, have replaced punji sticks as the guerrilla weapon of choice. If, 2 1/2 years in, you don't control the only road linking your military airport to your headquarters, you don't control much of anything.

                The next day, a U.S. Marine Corps brigadier general told a televised news conference that the escalating rate of car bombings in the capital and around the country was a sure sign of the enemy's "final desperation." (Two weeks later, Cheney issued his tweaked version.) The troops on the ground in Iraq, much like the grunts in Vietnam, know better. Yet by and large they're loyal, and most told me that they believe in the mission -- at least until they're ordered back for their second or third tours. These "stop loss" soldiers are most bitter about their perception that the administration's effort to wage the war on the cheap applies only to them, while private contractors grow rich.

                On the green plastic wall of a portable toilet at Baghdad military airport, I read the following graffiti, scrawled by a civilian contract employee: "14 months. $200,000. I'm out of here. [Expletive] you Iraq." Beneath it was a response from the ranks: "12 months. $20,000. What the [expletive] is going on here?" Speaking of money, the administration has never come clean about the massive debt it's piling up for us and our descendants. The nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that the Vietnam War cost the United States $600 billion in today's dollars. Iraq, according to the center, is costing between $5 billion and $8 billion a month -- $218 billion to date. That would mean $700 billion if the guns fall silent six years from now, a modest timetable according to numerous military analysts. Other estimates predict an eventual bottom line of over $1 trillion.

                So, do we cut our losses -- human and financial -- and leave? If so, when? If not, how long do we stay? If we stay, the insurgency continues; if we go, it most likely expands into an all-out civil war, the fragmenting of Iraq and the intervention of its neighbors, Iran, Turkey and Syria, followed by the collapse of promised democracy in the Middle East: a kind of reverse domino theory. What likely will happen in the short term, it's beginning to appear, will be an attempt to spin a more positive illusion: President Bush will order several thousand troops sent home in time for the 2006 midterm election campaign. He will claim that the Iraqis are taking charge of their own security (see "Vietnamization") and leave the mess to his successor.

                Then what? If the bulk of the 130,000 U.S. troops are kept in Iraq for the rump of the Bush presidency and into the next administration, whether Republican or Democratic, the insurgency will go on.

                The tax dollars we'll be spending on that military presence might be better spent on helping educate new generations of Iraqis, and millions of other young Muslims around the world, on the basics of running a country.They need it: "Democracy is wonderful," exclaimed a mother of two teenagers whom I met in the southern city of Basra. "It means you're free to do whatever you want." While that may be an understandable interpretation from a people who weren't free to do anything under Saddam Hussein's 35-year dictatorship, surely it's not what Americans are fighting and dying for.

                The ultimate lesson of Vietnam -- one that is applicable to Iraq -- has been that once Americans declared victory and returned home, the Vietnamese went through the inevitable, sometimes brutal, shakeout that we had merely delayed. Eventually, the realities of the marketplace and the appeal of capitalism resulted in a nominally communist but vibrant nation. Today, Americans feast on low-cost Vietnamese shrimp and wear inexpensive Vietnamese T-shirts. Two month ago, President Bush welcomed Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to the White House and promised him increased trade and military cooperation.

                So, what happens if we don't apply that lesson to our Iraq adventure? One of the most senior diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad told me that what he and his colleagues believed, and what kept them awake at night, was that if the United States is serious about establishing democracy in Iraq, and attempts to do so under current policies, it would take two generations of our soldiers fighting there. That's 40 years.

                You may want to pass that along to your grandchildren.

                Lewis Simons, a former foreign correspondent for The Post and for Knight Ridder newspapers, is a contributor to National Geographic.
                June 9, 1973 - The day athletic perfection was defined.

                http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-Kva...eature=related

                Comment


                • #9
                  You've pretty much hit it on the head. For all we know, we ARE getting the facts. But who can tell?

                  I guess the proof will be in the pudding, when Iraqis are regularly seen doing something except serving as suicide-bomb casualities.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by tallahassee blues fan@Aug 31 2005, 11:10 AM
                    I concur that Americans probably would have accepted other aims and that Bush hasn't made them.  My personal opinion as to why he didn't is because it takes a pretty articulate guy to make those points, and Bush ain't that guy. 

                    You've stated that we could leave as soon as the Iraqi army/police officers are trained.  Here is where I'm frustrated by the lack of reliable information by which to measure whether we are succeeding in that regard. Lots of editorial writers have made the point that we've trained far fewer than the administration claims were trained, and that the trainees are made up of a lot of insurgents.  I don't know whether the facts they rely on are any more reliable than what comes out of Rummy's mouth.  We should demand the facts, and honestly analyze them to see if they indicate that real progress has been made.  If they don't show any real progress, surely we have to consider the possible conclusion that we can't train them and cut our losses?

                    The problem with getting the facts is that the administration has lost its credibility so most are going to be suspicious of any version it offers.  And, as the author below correctly points out, its mantra is starting to sound eerily like one we've heard before. 

                    tbf, I have raised this same point several times -- Is the situation in Iraq improving or getting worse? I don't see how any US policy on Iraq can be advocated without a clear answer. I wish there was a debate that cast more light and less heat on the subject. It takes some effort to navigate between the happy talk emanating from Fox News and the Pentagon on one side and the doom and gloom reports spouted by the Michael Moore camp on the other side. There are some sources of objective data I would recommend. The www.cis.org website has some good information. A report by Anthony Cordesman, no apologist of the administration, was added August 22 on the state of Iraqi security. Here is the direct link:

                    http://www.csis.org/press/wf_2005_0822.pdf

                    The Pew Charitable Trusts is a good site for measuring changes in public opinion around the globe. The July 14, 2005 report on Global War on Terrorism has some interesting results. How has the perception of the US around the world changed from 9/11, 2002 to the present? Is support for Islamic jihadism growing? Asnwers to questions like these ought to give us some insight into how the war is going and, more importantly, some indications what we should do next. I was surprised to learn what countries have become more supportive of jihadism in the last 12 months.

                    http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/PRC_global_Terror_0705.pdf .

                    After reviewing the best evidence I can find, I believe that the situation in Iraq is clearly improving. The botched post war reconstruction management set back the recovery of Iraq by at least 18 months. Once the reality of the situation was acknowledged, the two tract plan outlined 18 months ago – 1) US forces to provide a security umbrella while Iraqi police and military forces are trained as fast as possible and 2) push the political process forward to achieve Iraqi sovereignty and self-government – appears to be the correct one. Iraqi resentment towards US occupation and general cynicism of US motives has subsided. Meanwhile, the vicious nature of the terrorist attacks, leveled increasingly against Iraqis rather than US forces, has seriously eroded popular support for the insurgents. Significant progress has been made on many levels in Iraq during the last 12 months. Unless something happens to reverse these trends, we can expect a much better situation 12 months from now. US forces can then be downscaled to a level comparable to those currently in Afghanistan.
                    "I am for truth no matter who says it. I am for justice no matter who it is for or against."...Malcom X

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      I assume the situation is indeed improving. The question is whether it's improving fast enough to suit American public opinion.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Reggie Cleveland@Sep 1 2005, 08:29 AM
                        I assume the situation is indeed improving. The question is whether it's improving fast enough to suit American public opinion.
                        I don't see any consensus that the situation is improving, at all. The get-out-now camp believes the situation is hopeless. Every report of an American death reinforces their perception that Iraq is coming apart at the seams. Trying to transplant democracy under those conditions is a pipe dream.

                        If I thought that view was accurate I would be all for getting out ASAP. However, if we make that decision based on an erroneous view of the reality on the ground, we will be making a disasterous mistake. Somalia, Gaza, and Fallujah have one thing in common -- the withrawal of forces was falsely portrayed as a defeat for propaganda purposes. Pulling out to leave Iraq to its own fate would surely be perceived as an American defeat. The Al Qaeda forces would be rejuevenated.

                        Reggie, here's the thing. People make declarations about Iraq as if they were talking about unquestioned laws of physics. More often than not, such statements are more urban myth than reality.

                        "The war in Iraq has created more terrorists, not less."
                        or
                        "Iraq is a quagmire. The insurgents are winning. Most Iraqis hate us. The economy of Iraq is a mess that won't get better until we leave."
                        or
                        "Muslims opinion of the US is worse because of the war in Iraq."
                        or
                        "The US has squandered the good will it had after 9/11 around the world."

                        These beliefs get repeated until they become accepted conventional wisdom. Are they accurate? Reasonable people can disagree but the proponderance of evidence disputes all of these statements. I have to believe that many who want the US to leave Iraq ASAP would reconsider if they thought the situation was improving.
                        "I am for truth no matter who says it. I am for justice no matter who it is for or against."...Malcom X

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          bump
                          Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law ~

                          A.C.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            A recent NY Times article on the "state of things" in Iraq:

                            September 9, 2005
                            The State of Iraq: An Update
                            By NINA KAMP, MICHAEL O’HANLON and AMY UNIKEWICZ
                            It was not a good summer in Iraq. After the midwinter bright spots - reductions in violence, greater economic vitality, the famous purple fingers of voters - the situation worsened as the weather warmed. Most worrisome, the constitutional process has failed to bring aboard Sunni Arabs, who remain the core of the insurgency. While Shiites and Kurds wisely compromised on some key points, they favor an oil-allocation scheme that Sunnis fear could deprive them of their fair share of Iraq's natural wealth.

                            There is, as always, some good news. The government has made progress on managing inflation, rewriting banking laws and adopting strict budgetary rules to prevent deficit spending. Telephone and Internet use continue to increase; gross domestic product is greater than during Saddam Hussein's latter years in power; school enrollment is up 20 percent since 2000. And somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of Iraqi security forces are now fairly capable.

                            But on balance the indicators are troubling. Electricity production remains stuck at prewar levels even as demand soars, and the power is off in Baghdad more often than it is on. Unemployment is stubbornly high. Infant mortality rates are still among the Middle East's highest. And Iraq is the most violent country in the region, not only in terms of war casualties but of criminal murders as well. On one point at least, pessimists and optimists about Iraq tend to agree: the situation needs a major boost from the political process. In that light, the Oct. 15 referendum on the draft constitution looms very large.

                            Nina Kamp and Michael O'Hanlon are, respectively, a senior research assistant and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. Amy Unikewicz is a graphic designer in South Norwalk, Conn.
                            June 9, 1973 - The day athletic perfection was defined.

                            http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-Kva...eature=related

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              If this were a chess match - I would advise Bush to settle for a draw.

                              The only problem is there is no rational other side which to offer a draw too.

                              A draw would have us out of Iraq - leaving the people we picked to be in charge.

                              They have had no more success against the insurgents than we have.

                              No one knows what the insurgents want other than us leaving and perhaps a return to a Sunni ruling body.

                              That's what makes it so difficult. We could lose a war - to no one.
                              Turning the other cheek is better than burying the other body.

                              Official Sport Lounge Sponsor of Rhode Island - Quincy Jones - Yadier Molina who knows no fear.
                              God is stronger and the problem knows it.

                              2017 BOTB bracket

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